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COPYRIGHTING THE USER INTERFACE:
Too MUCH PROTECTION?
by Joseph T. Verdesca, Jr.
I. INTRODUCTION
OFTWARE plays an increasingly important role in the computer in-
dustry.' Employers today regard a working understanding of the
more common applications 2 as a valuable asset and increasingly as a
necessity. 3 An intuitive user interface4 can greatly reduce the difficulties in-
volved in acquiring or developing such skills.5 For this reason, the user in-
terface represents a very valuable aspect of a program, perhaps the most
valuable one.6 The development of the user interface requires extensive
work and effort on the part of the developers, sometimes much more than is
involved even in writing the actual computer code.7 This comment ad-
1. See Airing Both Sides of the 'Look-and-Feel' Debate, COMPUTERWORLD, Aug. 13,
1990, at 171 (Computer software has become the driving force of the industry ...."); Copy-
right Protection of Computer Software, 5 COMPUTER L. REP. 413 (1985).
2. The Copyright Act of 1976 (the Act) defines a computer program as "a set of state-
ments or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a
certain result." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988). One or more programs constitute an application.
Word processing, spreadsheets, and databases are examples of applications.
3. See Jacobs, Copyright and Compatibility, 30 JURIMETRICS J. 91, 99 (1989) ("As com-
puting power is disseminated further throughout enterprises and corporations, the investment
in training in the user interface becomes an increasingly important component of the enter-
prise's competitive advantage."); Note, Protecting the Look and Feel of Computer Programs, 10
CARDOZO L. REv. 561, 575 n.36 (1988) [hereinafter Note, Protecting the Look].
4. The user interface includes the menu system of commands, including its structure,
organization, and choice of terms, the function key assignments, screen displays, and macro
language. See infra note 252 and accompanying text. See also Chisum, Dreyfuss, Goldstein,
Gorman, Karjala, Kitch, Menell, Raskind, Reichman, Samuelson, LaST Frontier Conference
Report on Copyright Protection of Computer Software, 30 JURIMETRICS J. 15, 26 (1989) [herein-
after LaST Conference Report] ("User interfaces include all of the devices by which the
human user can interact with the computer in order to accomplish the tasks the computer is
programmed to perform.").
5. See Note, Protecting the Look, supra note 3, at 576 ("A program that mirrors the
user's thought process allows that user to spend time concentrating on the substance of his task
rather than on the steps necessary to operate a computer.").
6. See Note, A Thousand Clones: The Scope of Copyright Protection in the "Look and
Feel" of Computer Programs, 63 WASH. L. REv. 195, 195 (1988) ("[T]he 'user interface' (or
'look and feel') is the single most important factor in the marketability of a computer pro-
gram." (footnotes omitted)).
7. Whelan Assocs., Inc v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 797 F.2d 1222, 1231 (3d Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987); Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F.
Supp. 37, 56 (D. Mass. 1990). See also INFO WORLD, Nov. 11, 1985, at 13 ("the 'look and feel'
of a computer software product often involves much more creativity and often is of greater
commercial value than the program code which implements the product ....").
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dresses the question of how much protection the copyright laws afford the
user interface.
Current case law extends copyright protection to the user interface"
Judge Robert Keeton directly addressed this issue in Lotus Development
Corp. v. Paperback Software International.9 The Lotus court held that the
structure, sequence, and organization of the 1-2-3 menu structure consti-
tuted copyrightable material.1° The computer industry" reacted with sur-
prise and anger.12 Further controversy arose when Lotus sued two other
competitors for user interface infringement within a week of defeating Pa-
perback.' 3 What effect the Lotus decision will have on the computer indus-
try remains uncertain.' 4
This Comment analyzes the protection provided under the Copyright Act
of 1976 (the Act)15 for the user interface, 16 the soundness of such construc-
tions, and offers a proposal for new legislation. '7 This Comment argues that
current copyright law provides too much protection to the look and feel of
user interfaces. '8 This overprotection prevents the public from receiving im-
portant benefits that would derive from standardization and increased
8. See infra notes 143-301 and accompanying text.
9. 740 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990). See generally Note, Lotus Development Corp. v.
Paperback Software International: Broad Copyright Protection For User Interfaces Ignores The
Software Industry's Trend Toward Standardization, 52 U. Prrr. L. REv. 689 (1991). In Octo-
ber 1990 Paperback agreed to pay Lotus $500,000, discontinue producing its spreadsheet pro-
grams, and not appeal the trial court's decision. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1990, at D4, col. 3.
10. Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 68.
11. Ashton-Tate and Apple, however, who are currently suing other companies for user
interface infringement, were most likely pleased by the decision. See Barker, Nanobytes, BYTE,
Sept. 1990, at 20.
12. See Dvorak, The Death of Code, PC MAGAZINE, Nov. 13, 1990, at 81. But see Dyson,
Lotus Lawsuit Leaves a Gloomy Lesson, PC COMPUTING, October 1990, at 21 (stating that,
although Lotus deserved to win its suit, it should compete in the marketplace rather than in
the courts). But cf Zachmann, Lotus-Paperback Precedent Need Not Harm the Industry, PC
WEEK, July 9, 1990, at 10 ("Provided that the courts reject the broader claims to copyright
protection in cases where direct copying of a program as a whole is not involved, competition,
innovation and the vigor of the software industry aren't likely to be severely threatened.").
Lotus' victory also drew protests. See, e.g., COMPUTERWORLD, Aug. 6, 1990, at 6 (quoting
Richard Stallman, founder of the League of Programming Freedom: "We have come to warn
the public of the terrible harm that Lotus is trying to do to computer users.").
13. See, e.g., Lavin, Spirit of the Law: Lotus Development Corp.'s Lawsuits, PC USER, July
18, 1990, at 29 (commenting on the short period ("less than a week") between winning the
Paperback suit and filing against two more competitors).
14. Lotus has negotiated settlements with three of its competitors. See Lotus Dev. Corp.
v. Mosaic Software, Inc., No. 870074K (D. Mass. filed Jan. 12, 1987) (settled prior to trial);
Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F.Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990) (settled after
the court found for Lotus: Paperback agreed to pay $500,000, remove its product from the
market, and not appeal the judgment); Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Santa Cruz Operation, Inc., (filed
one week after Lotus won its case against Paperback, and settled on June 17, 1991. See, e.g.,
N.Y. Times, June 18, 1991, at D4, col. 2.). Lotus' suit against Borland Software, Inc., perhaps
the most important of the four suits brought by Lotus, is still pending. See Siegmann, Lotus
Wins Third Copyright Battle, San Francisco Chronicle, June 18, 1991, at Cl. See also the
interview with Borland discussing the case in Business Wire, June 19, 1991.
15. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1988 & Supp. 1989).
16. See infra notes 143-301 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 308-41 and accompanying text.




Computer software differs from other types of works protected by the
Act.20 This Comment shows that the current copyright law fails to accom-
modate the unique characteristics of software, such as the lack of industry
standards, the importance of building on prior innovations, the functional
nature of software, the rapid pace of development, the corresponding rate of
obsolescence, and the complex nature of the subject matter. 21 Separate and
specific legislation is required to balance properly the public good with pri-
vate interests in the context of software publication.22
The Comment is organized as follows. First, the Comment provides an
overview of the historical development of the law. 23 The second section
presents the law as currently formed by the leading cases. 24 The third sec-
tion then discusses the need for a statutory solution to the problem of bal-
ancing protection and public interest in the software context. 25
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF COPYRIGHT IN
THE SOFTWARE CONTEXT
A. Constitutional Basis
The United States Constitution provides the basis of American copyright
law.26 The Constitution empowers Congress to grant limited monopolies to
authors of works as an incentive to produce those works, which, in turn,
would benefit the public. 27 The Supreme Court has emphasized that the
benefit to the public is the primary rationale for copyright protection, 28
19. See Damman, Copyright of Computer Display Screens: Summary and Suggestions, 9
COMPUTER L.J. 417, 445 (1989) (standardization of user interfaces would benefit the public in
increasing the users' ability to change software packages with the minimum of retraining.
Such standardization would also push software companies to rely on the competitiveness of
their product instead of on the inertia of an installed base of users trained only in their proprie-
tary interface.).
20. See infra notes 308-31 and accompanying text.
21. See generally Note, Protecting the Look, supra note 3, at 578, 591.
22. See infra notes 332-41 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 97-142 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 143-301 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 308-41 and accompanying text.
26. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("The Congress shall have Power... To promote the
Progress of Science and Useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.").
27. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954) ("The economic philosophy behind the clause
empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of
individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents
of authors and inventors in 'Science and Useful Arts.' "). See also I M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 1.03[A], at 132 (1987) ("IT]he authorization to grant to individual authors the
limited monopoly of copyright is predicated upon the dual premises that the public benefits
from the creative activities of authors, and that the copyright monopoly is a necessary condi-
tion to the full realization of such creative activities.").
28. See Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932) ("The sole interest of the
United States and the primary object in conferring the monopoly lie in the general benefits
derived by the public from the labors of authors."). See also Twentieth Century Music Corp.
v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) ("The immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a
fair return for an author's creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimu-
late artistic creativity for the public good.").
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while the private benefit of the author is only of secondary consideration.2 9
Both Congress and the courts must balance two competing interests: the
encouragement of progress and innovation of an art or science,30 and the
broad public availability of the fruits of the authors' labors. 3 1 Without any
protection authors would lose the incentive to innovate, and as a conse-
quence the public would have fewer works to enjoy.3 2 With too much pro-
tection the law would stifle innovation, and the public would again lose. 3 3
B. Statutory Embodiment
The Constitution limits Congress's power to grant copyright protection in
two ways: the protection must be for a limited duration, 34 and the primary
purpose must be public rather than private benefit. 3" Congress has not ex-
tended protection to all works.36 In order to qualify for protection under the
Act, the item must be original, 37 a work of authorship, 38 and fixed in a tangi-
ble medium of expression. 39 Examples of works of authorship include liter-
ary works4o and pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works.41 Congress
29. See United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) ("The copyright
law, like the patent statute, makes reward to the owner a secondary consideration").
30. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) ("Sacrificial days devoted to such crea-
tive activities deserve rewards commensurate with the services rendered.").
31. See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).
The limited scope of the copyright holder's statutory monopoly, like the limited
copyright duration required by the Constitution, reflects a balance of competing
interest: Creative work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but private motiva-
tion must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public availability of
literature, music, and the other arts.
Id.
See also Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1235 (3d
Cir. 1986) ("[Tmhe purpose of copyright law is to create the most efficient and productive
balance between protection (incentive) and dissemination of information, to promote learning,
culture and development."), cert denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987); Sid & Marty Kroffl Television
Prod., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 1977) ("This principle [the
idea-expression dichotomy] attempts to reconcile two competing social interests: rewarding an
individual's creativity and effort while at the same time permitting the nation to enjoy the
benefits and progress from use of the same subject matter.").
32. See infra note 85 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 308-31 and accompanying text.
34. See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) ("The mo-
nopoly that Congress may authorize are neither unlimited nor primarily designed to provide a
special private benefit.").
35. Id.
36. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prod., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1163
(9th Cir. 1977).
37. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1988) (effective Jan. 1, 1978). The originality requirement is mini-
mal, requiring only that the work "owes its origin" to the author. See Burrow-Giles Litho-
graphic Co. v. Sarony, Ill U.S. 53 (1884).
38. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988).
39. Id. ("Copyright protection subsists.., in original works of authorship fixed in any
tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be per-
ceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or
device.").
40. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) (" 'Literary works' are works, other than audiovisual works,
expressed in words, numbers, or other verbal or numerical symbols or indicia, regardless of the
nature of the material objects .. in which they are embodied.").
41. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(l), (5) (1988).
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expressly excluded ideas, processes and discoveries. 42 Furthermore, the Act
grants only limited protection to useful articles.4 3
C. Judicial Doctrines
The courts must interpret the Act." Courts interpreting the Act have
developed three interrelated concepts: the idea-expression dichotomy,45 the
doctrine of merger,46 and the concept of scenes a faire.4 7 These concepts
merit discussion before reviewing the cases dealing with protection of the
user interface.
1. The Idea-Expression Dichotomy
The idea expression dichotomy serves as a limiting principle to the scope
of copyright protection.4 8 The oft-repeated rule that copyright protects only
expression and never ideas49 is simple enough to state, yet difficult to apply.
"Pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works" include two-dimensional and three-
dimensional works of fine, graphic, and applied art, photographs, prints and art
reproductions, maps, globes, charts, diagrams, models, and technical drawings,
including architectural plans. Such works shall include works of artistic crafts-
manship insofar as their form but not their mechanical or utilitarian aspects are
concerned; the design of a useful article ... shall be considered a pictorial,
graphic, or sculptural work only if, and only to the extent that, such design
incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified sepa-
rately from, and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects
of the article.
A "useful article" is an article having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not
merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey information. An
article that is normally part of a useful article is considered a "useful article."
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
42. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988) ("In no case does copyright protection for an original work
of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept,
principle or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or
embodied in such work."). See also H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 51, 57, reprinted
in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5659, 5670 [hereinafter House Report] ("the
actual processes or methods embodied in the program are not within the scope of the copyright
law").
43. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) ("ITihe design of a useful article ... shall be considered a
pictorial, graphic or sculptural work [and thus copyrightable] only if, and to the extent that,
such design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified sepa-
rately from, and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the
article.").
44. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 46 (D. Mass. 1990).
45. See infra notes 48-62 and accompanying text.
46. See infra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
47. See infra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
48. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prod., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1163
(9th Cir. 1977) ("Clearly the scope of copyright protection does not go this far. A limiting
principle is needed. This is provided by the classic distinction between an 'idea' and the 'ex-
pression' of that idea.").
49. See supra note 42. See also Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954) ("Unlike a pat-
ent, a copyright gives no exclusive right to the art disclosed; protection is given only to the
expression of the idea not the idea itself."); Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102 (1880) ("The
description of the art in a book, though entitled to the benefit of copyright, lays no foundation
for an exclusive claim to the art itself."); Whelan Assocs., Inc v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory,
Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1234 (3d Cir. 1986) ("It is axiomatic that copyright does not protect ideas
1991] 1051
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The difficulty arises in defining the idea, and in drawing the line between that
idea and its expression. 50
In Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc.51 a court,
however, attempted to formulate a rule. The court in Whelan distinguished
the idea from its expression by determining what elements were exclusive to
the idea.5 2 The court would not protect any material essential or necessary
only to the idea. 53 Protection could extend to those elements not necessary
or essential to the idea. 54
Judge Learned Hand,55 on the other hand, declared that a judge must
make the distinction on a case-by-case basis.56 Judge Hand devised an ap-
proach based on abstractions. 57 Under this approach one would consider a
work from the most detailed to the most abstract levels. 58 Between those
extremes exists a point at which protection of the abstraction would also
protect the idea. 59 This point provides the basis for distinguishing idea from
expression6° but must again be determined on a case-by-case basis.6' The
distinction between idea and expression provides a powerful policy tool to
the courts, as copyrightability can turn entirely upon the definition of the
only, but the expression of ideas."), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987); Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1163
("It is an axiom of copyright law that the protection granted to a copyrighted work extends
only to the particular expression of the idea and never to the idea itself."). See also Note,
Copyright Protection of Computer Screen Displays, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1123, 1156 (1988)
("[Tihe demarcation of uncopyrightable idea from copyrightable expression.., is a subjective,
policy-guided process.").
50. See Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1163 ("The difficulty comes in attempting to distill the unpro-
tected idea from the protected expression."). See also Franklin Mint Corp. v. National Wild-
life Art Exch., Inc., 575 F.2d 62, 65 (3d Cir.) (distinguishing between idea and expression in
any given work is a very subjective process), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 880 (1978).
51. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1235-36 ("[Tjhe purpose or function of a utilitarian work would
be the work's idea, and everything that is not necessary to that purpose or function would be part
of the expression of the idea" (emphasis in original)).
52. Id. at 1236.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Judge Learned Hand decided many of the foundation cases in copyright law, includ-
ing Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1960); Sheldon v.
Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1936), aff'd, 309 U.S. 390 (1940); Nichols
v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931).
56. Peter Pan, 274 F.2d at 489 ("The test for infringement of a copyright is of necessity
vague.... Obviously, no principle can be stated as to when an imitator has gone beyond
copying the 'idea,' and has borrowed its 'expression.' Decisions must therefore inevitably be
ad hoc."). See also Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 615
(7th Cir.) ("There is no litmus paper test by which to apply the idea-expression distinction; the
determination is necessarily subjective."), cert denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982); Nichols v. Univer-
sal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) ("Nobody has ever been able to fix that
boundary [between idea and expression], and nobody ever can."), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902
(1931).
57. Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121 ("Upon any work.., a great number of patterns of increasing
generality will fit equally well, as more and more of the incident is left out.... [T]here is a
point in this series of abstractions where they are no longer protected, since otherwise the
playwright could prevent the use of his 'ideas,' to which, apart from their expression, his prop-








2. The Concept of Merger
The doctrine of merger stems from the idea-expression dichotomy.63
Copyright does not protect expression where only one or a limited number
of ways of expressing that idea exist. 64 To protect the expression in such
circumstances would create the potential for monopolization of the idea by
copyrighting all possible expressions of that idea. 65 The Whelan court's
analysis, 66 based on necessity, reflects this same concern.67 The doctrine of
merger supplements the principle of the idea-expression dichotomy in that it
prevents the removal of ideas from the public domain through copyright
law.
68
62. See infra notes 213-301 and accompanying text.
63. See Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Phillips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 616 (7th
Cir.) (merger is a "related concept" of the idea-expression dichotomy), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
880 (1982).
64. See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 103 (1879) (referring to a ledger form necessary to
an accounting system in a book: "where the art it teaches cannot be used without employing
the methods and diagrams used to illustrate the book, or such as are similar to them, such
methods and diagrams are to be considered as necessary incidents to the art, and given there-
with to the public"). See also M. Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 436 (4th Cir.
1986) (test in computer context is if "there is only one way to express the idea, 'idea' and
'expression' merge and there is no copyrightable material."); Atari, 672 F.2d at 616 ("[Wlhere
idea and expression are indistinguishable, the copyright will protect against only identical
copying."); Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 741-42 (9th Cir.
1971) (expression of jeweled bee pin merges with idea of same, as there exists only a limited
number of ways in which to express the idea of a jeweled bee pin); Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paper-
back Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 59 (D. Mass. 1990) ("If a particular expression is one of a
quite limited number of the possible ways of expressing an idea, then ... the expression is not
copyrightable."); Manufacturers Technologies, Inc. v. CAMS, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 984, 995 (D.
Conn. 1989) (placement of menus and tools on screen was one of only a very limited number of
ways of expressing the idea of formatting a screen display for ease of use); Digital Communica-
tions v. Softklone Distrib., 659 F. Supp. 449, 457 (N.D. Ga. 1987) ("ideas, as such, are not
copyrightable and, as a corollary, necessary expression incident to an idea 'merge' with that
idea and also are not copyrightable. .. ").
65. See Digital, 659 F. Supp. at 458 ("If there exists only one expression for an idea, then
granting copyright protection with its attendant ease of obtainment and long duration ...
would unduly prevent use of the idea by society."). See also Morrissey v. Proctor & Gamble
Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678-79 (1st Cir. 1967):
When the uncopyrightable subject matter is very narrow, so that "the topic nec-
essarily requires,"... at best only a limited number [of forms of expression], to
permit copyrighting would mean that a party or parties, by copyrighting a mere
handful of forms, could exhaust all possibilities of all future use of the substance.
In such circumstances... the subject matter would be appropriated by permit-
ting the copyrighting of its expression .... [I]n these circumstances, we hold
that the copyright does not extend to the subject matter at all, and plaintiff
cannot complain even if his particular expression was deliberately adopted.
Id.
66. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
67. Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1236 (3d Cir.
1986) ("Where there are various means of achieving the desired purpose, then the particular
means chosen is not necessary to the purpose; hence, there is expression, not idea."), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
68. See supra notes 48-62 and accompanying text.
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3. The Concept of Scenes a Faire
The concept of scenes afaire derives from the doctrine of merger.69 Copy-
right law will not protect scenes a faire.70 Examples of scenes a faire include
elements of a work which represent the only reasonable way of expressing a
certain idea. 71 If the idea were a maze-chase game such as PACMAN, the
maze, scoring table, wraparound tunnel and scoring dots are all elements
indispensable to the idea and thus constitute scenes a faire. 72 Like merger,
the concept of scenes a faire seeks to prevent the removal of ideas from the
public domain through copyright.73
D. Protection of Nonliteral Elements
Copyright clearly protects literal aspects of a copyrighted work. 74 Find-
ing which nonliteral aspects of any given work also enjoy protection presents
a more difficult problem. 7" In the computer context, the actual code (both
source and object) constitutes the literal aspect of a program,"6 and it is well
established that it is a work of authorship and a literary work.77 Thus copy-
right protects the program code itself.78  Copyright also extends to a
69. See Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1236 ("Consideration of copyright doctrines related to scenes
a faire and fact-intensive works supports our formulation, for they reflect the same underlying
principle").
70. See Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 616 (7th
Cir.) (such stock literary devices are not protectible by copyright), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 380
(1982); Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1236 ("Scenes a faire are afforded no protection because the sub-
ject matter represented can be expressed in no other way than through the particular scene a
faire").
71. See Alexander v. Haley, 460 F. Supp. 40, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) ("[I]ncidents, characters
or settings which are as a practical manner indispensable, or at least standard, in the treatment
of a given topic" constitute scenes a faire.); Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, 533
F.2d 87, 91 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 980 (1976); Atari, 672 F.2d at 616.
72. Atari, 672 F.2d at 617.
73. See Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc., 736 F.2d 485, 489 (9th
Cir.) (granting a copyright "would give the first author a monopoly on the commonplace ideas
behind the scenes a faire"), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1037 (1984).
74. The Act defines literary works as "works, other than audiovisual works, expressed in
words, numbers or other verbal or numerical symbols or indicia, regardless of the nature of the
material objects such as books, periodicals, manuscripts, phonorecords, film, tapes, disks, or
cards, in which they are embodied." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988). See House Report, supra note
42, at 54, reprinted at 5667 ("[tlhe term 'literary works'. . . includes.., computer programs").
See also Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1246-47 (3d Cir.
1983) (source and object code protected), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984); Stern Elec.
Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 855 n.3 (2d Cir. 1982) ("written computer programs are copy-
rightable as literary works"); Williams Elec., Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 876-77 (3d
Cir. 1982) (object code); Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 49 (D.
Mass. 1990) ("computer programs fall squarely within the statutory definition of literary
works"); Digital Communications Assocs., Inc. v. Softklone Distrib. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 449,
454 (N.D. Ga. 1987); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741, 750 (N.D. Ill. 1983)
(source and object code); Hubco Data Prod., Corp. v. Management Assistance Inc., 219
U.S.P.Q. 450, 454 (D. Idaho 1983) (object code).
75. Note, The Test for Proving Copyright Infringement of Computer Software: "Structure,
Sequence, and Organization" and "Look and Feel"cases, 14 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 105, 106
(1988) [hereinafter Note, Proving Copyright Infringement].
76. See id.
77. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
78. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
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flowchart of a program.79
The structure, sequence, and organization of the user interface qualify as
nonliteral aspects of a program8 0 The question of whether copyright pro-
tects these elements has plagued the courts.8 1 Further, if the law undertakes
to protect the interface, the courts must determine the extent of that
protection.
Even completely different programs, written independently in different
programming languages for different machines, can produce nearly identical
screen displays.8 2 In such a situation, since the computer code was not du-
plicated, no literal copying occurred. 3 Yet, to the user, the second program
looks like the original work. The following hypothetical illustrates the
problem.
Creator has developed a new user interface for a program. Creator spent
time, effort, and money optimizing the interface for ease of use, intuitiveness,
and efficiency. The interface works well and quickly develops a strong cus-
tomer base. Clonemaker, seeing the utility and popularity of the interface,
integrates many of its elements8 4 into his own work. Clonemaker lacks Cre-
ator's expenses of designing, developing, optimizing, and marketing the in-
terface and thus can sell the clone program for less. In this way Clonemaker
can steal Creator's customer base by offering a product substantially identi-
cal to Creator's less expensive product. Such unbeatable competition dis-
courages Creator from expending the money and effort needed to develop
innovative interfaces.8 5
79. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USE OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS,
FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 43 (1978) [hereinafter CONTU FINAL REPORT],
reprinted in 5 COPYRIGHT, CONGRESS AND TECHNOLOGY: THE PUBLIC RECORD (N. Henry,
ed. 1980), cited with approval in Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp.
37, 45 (D. Mass. 1990) and in Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797
F.2d 1222, 1241 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987). See also Data Cash Sys.,
Inc. v. JS&A Group, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 1063, 1067 n.4 (N.D. Il1. 1979) (protection under
copyright covers "computer programs in their flow chart, source and assembly phases," hold-
ing that object code and therefore program at bar was not copyrightable), aff'd on other
grounds, 628 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1980) (publication without notice rendered program un-
copyrightable); Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003,
1013 n.5 (N.D. Tex. 1978) (noted in dictum that "it would probably be a violation to take a
detailed description of a particular problem solution, such as a flowchart" and create a pro-
gram with it).
80. Note, Proving Copyright Infringement, supra note 75, at 106.
81. See infra notes 97-301 and accompanying text.
82. See Manufacturers Technologies, Inc. v. CAMS, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 984, 991 (D.
Conn. 1989) ("[T]wo different computer programs, whose source codes were created indepen-
dently of one another, can produce computer screen displays which are very similar, if not
totally alike"); see also Stern Elec., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 855 (2d Cir. 1982) ("many
different computer programs can produce the same 'results,' whether those results are an anal-
ysis of financial records or a sequence of images and sounds"); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohan,
564 F. Supp. 741, 749 (N.D. Ill. 1983) ("it is quite possible to design a game that would
infringe Midway's audiovisual copyright but would use an entirely different computer
program").
83. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
84. Elements could include the locations, structures, and terms used in the command
menu.




Courts have long dealt with the protection of nonliteral elements of liter-
ary works outside of the computer context.8 6 Copyright protects some non-
literal elements of traditional works, including plot, characters, and
setting.8 7 In these cases courts have often based their findings of infringe-
ment on the total concept or feel of the allegedly infringing work.88 In addi-
tion, protection for structure, sequence, and organization is recognized in
the non-computer context in compilations and derivative works.89
Protection of nonliteral elements in the computer context has proved
more troublesome. 90 Courts have held the structure, sequence, and organi-
zation of the computer code to be copyrightable. 91 The problem for the
[D]eveloping an interface is a creative and time-consuming activity, and the in-
terface designers deserve sufficient protection to ensure appropriate rewards.
Furthermore, it has been argued that protecting interfaces may encourage "leap-
frogging," that is, development of interfaces that are substantially different and
much better. If interfaces are less protected, one could argue that there would
be a lot of "sheep" in the world.
Id. at 88. See supra notes 26-33 and accompanying text.
86. See Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 56 (2d Cir. 1936) ("[A]
play may be pirated without using the dialogue .... [N]o plagiarist can excuse the wrong by
showing how much of his work he did not pirate"), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 669 (1936). See also
Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 663 F. Supp. 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (substantial
similarity does not require duplication or near identity (movie poster)); Warner Bros. Inc. v.
American Broadcasting Co., 720 F.2d 231, 241 (2d Cir. 1983) (infringement based on "total
concept and feel" of Superman character); Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prod., Inc. v. Mc-
Donald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1167 (9th Cir. 1977) ("total concept and feel" of characters);
Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 1970) (infringement of
card found based on "total concept and feel."); Detective Comics, Inc. v. Bruns Publications,
Inc., 111 F.2d 432, 433 (2d Cir. 1940) (infringement of comic book character); Nichols v.
Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (protection of literary property in
the context of a play is not limited literally to the text, "else a plagiarist would escape by
immaterial variations"), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931); Fred Fisher, Inc. v. Dillingham, 298
F. 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) (finding infringement of music even where melodies were different).
87. See supra note 86.
88. See Roth, 429 F.2d at 1106; Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1167; Hartman v. Hallmark Cards,
Inc., 833 F.2d 117, 120 (8th Cir. 1987); Warner Bros., Inc. v. American Broadcasting Co., 720
F.2d 231, 241 (2d Cir. 1983); Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672
F.2d 607, 614 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982).
89. 17 U.S.C. § 103 (1988) extends protection to compilations and derivative works,
which are defined in 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) as follows:
A "compilation" is a work formed by the collection and assembling of preexist-
ing materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way
that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship.
A "derivative work" is a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such
as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion
picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation,
or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A
work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifi-
cations which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a "deriva-
tive work."
Id.
90. At least two different lines of thought are present in court decisions regarding the
protection of nonliteral elements such as the user interface or the code structure. Compare
infra note 97 (cases supporting the protection of nonliteral elements) with infra note 124 (cases
denying copyright protection to nonliteral elements).
91. See Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1240 (3d
Cir. 1986) (protection extends to "structure, sequence and organization"), cert. denied, 479
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courts is the protection of the user interface, including the menu structure,
organization, command terms, and display screens.92 While software manu-
facturers have brought numerous look and feel lawsuits,93 few have been
adjudicated. 94
Protecting the user interface implicates the precarious balance between
providing adequate incentive to spur innovation and allowing the public to
benefit from standardized interfaces.95 The difficulty lies in providing just
the right amount of protection. Too much protection would fragment the
market and deprive the public of the benefits of interface standardization. 96
Too little protection would reduce the incentive to innovate, thus depriving
the public of the benefits of new creations and progress in the field.
1. Protection of Structure, Sequence, and Organization: Whelan v. Jaslow
and Other Cases.
Several courts have extended protection to the nonliteral aspects of com-
puter programs.97 In Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory,
U.S. 1031 (1987); SAS Inst., Inc. v. S & H Computer Sys., Inc., 605 F. Supp. 816, 830 (M.D.
Tenn. 1985) (copyright protects "organization and structural details"); QCo. Indus. v. Hoff-
man, 625 F. Supp. 608 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (copyright extends to "structure and arrangement" of
program). But see Plains Cotton Coop. Ass'n v. Goodpasture Computer Serv., Inc., 807 F.2d
1256 (5th Cir. 1987) (rejecting protection of structure, sequence and organization), reh'g de-
nied, 813 F.2d 407 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 821 (1987); Synercom Technology, Inc. v.
University Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003, 1013 (N.D. Tex. 1978) ("If sequencing and
ordering is expression, what separable idea is expressed?"). See infra note 97 and accompany-
ing text.
92. Display screens have some probative value in analyzing infringement of the underly-
ing program. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1244. Courts have classified screen displays found in video
games as audiovisual works. See M. Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421 (4th Cir.
1986); Williams Elec., Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982); Atari, Inc. v.
North Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880
(1982).
93. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
94. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990). See
infra notes 213-301 and accompanying text.
95. See Spector, supra note 85, at 87 ("If a society is to foster creativity it must provide
sufficient benefit to the innovators. Balanced against that, society must also ensure that design-
ers can build upon the advances of others. Innovators need protection, but not monopoly, and
society needs a system that promotes technical progress.").
96. See Farrell, Standardization and Intellectual Property, 30 JURIMETRICS J. 35, 42
(1989) (With strong protection, however, compatible competition is prevented, and competi-
tion may be diverted to incompatible products. Thus intellectual property protection may tend
to obstruct de facto standardization, destroying network benefits and fragmenting the
market.").
97. See Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1248 (3rd
Cir. 1986) ("copyright protection of computer programs may extend beyond the programs'
literal code to their structure, sequence, and organization"), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987);
Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, 648 F. Supp. 1127, 1133 (N.D. Cal. 1986)
("copyright protection is not limited to the literal aspects of a computer program, but rather
... it extends to the overall structure of a program, including its audiovisual displays"). See
also Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Phoenix Control Sys., Inc., 886 F.2d 1173, 1175 (9th Cir. 1989)
("structure, sequence and/or organization of the program, the user interface, and the function,
or purpose, of the program" are copyrightable so long as they are expression rather than idea);
Telemarketing Resources v. Symantec Corp., 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1991, 1993 (N.D. Cal.
1989) ("Copyright protection applies to the user interface, or overall structure and organiza-
tion of a computer program, including its audiovisual displays, or screen 'look and feel' ");
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Inc.,g8 a well-known opinion, the court held that a program's copyright pro-
tection goes beyond the literal code to the program's structure.99 The case
involved a dental laboratory record keeping program, rewritten in a different
programming language for a different computer system.1°° The primary is-
sue facing the court was that of substantial similarity. 10 1 As in the hypothet-
ical, no literal copying of computer code occurred. 0 2 The court considered
the copyrightability of a program's structure. 0 3 The defendants argued that
the structure of a computer program is idea rather than expression, and
therefore not copyrightable. 104 The court rejected this argument, creating a
rule for distinguishing idea from expression in the software context.'0 5
Citing Baker v. Selden, 1° 6 the court opined that the purpose of a work is
its idea, and anything not essential to that purpose constitutes expression of
that idea.10 7 The court relied on the concept of scenes a faire to support this
rule, emphasizing that any elements necessary to a work's purpose or func-
tion merge with the work's idea. '0 8 The court also cited the limited protec-
tion of factual material as supporting its rule for defining the boundary
between idea and expression in software. 109 The court first reasoned that
something, such as the retelling of a historical event, can only be accom-
plished in a limited number of ways. Thus, the device used to retell the
event merges with the idea.1 10 Such a device, therefore, receives no protec-
tion from copyright. I 1
The Whelan court believed that the economic implications of its rule were
consistent with the purpose of copyright law. 1 2 Noting that one of the
greatest costs associated with a program's development lies in establishing its
structure and logic, the court stated that its rule would protect the incentive
Pearl Sys., Inc. v. Competition Elec., Inc., 8 U.S.P.Q.2d 1520, 1524, Copyright L. Dec. (CCH)
26,338 (S.D.Fla. 1988) ("Copyright protection of computer software is not limited to the text
of the source or object code"); SAS Inst., Inc. v. S & H Computer Sys., Inc., 605 F. Supp. 816,
825 (N.D. Tenn. 1985) ("copying of the organization and structural details" can constitute
infringement); QCo. Indus. v. Hoffman, 625 F. Supp. 608, 616 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (no infringe-
ment found in case at bar, but similar "structure and arrangement" of programs can constitute
infringement). But see infra note 124 and accompanying text.
98. 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
99. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1236.
100. Id. at 1225-27.
101. Id. at 1232-33.
102. Id. at 1233.
103. Id. at 1234.
104. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1235.
105. Id. at 1236.
106. 101 U.S. 99, 103 (1879). But see Sumner, The Copyright/Patent Interface: Patent
Protection for the Structure of Program Code, 30 JURIMETRICS J. 107, 114 (1989) (stating that
a program's structure, as a patentable function or process, is an idea and cannot be copyright-
able, and citing Baker v. Selden as holding "that subject matter protectable by patent law is not
the object of copyright protection.").
107. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1236.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1236-37.
110. Id. at 1237.
111. Id.
112. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1237.
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necessary for innovation in the field, while still allowing competition. 13 The
court found no qualitative differences between progress in the computer field
and progress in the other areas traditionally covered by copyright.' 14 For
this reason the court held that traditional copyright principles apply in the
computer software context.1 15
The Whelan court declined to follow the holding of Synercom Technology,
Inc. v. University Computing Co. 116 The court in Synercom held that the
sequencing and ordering of input formats constituted ideas, not expres-
sion. 11' The Whelan court first distinguished Synercom on the basis of the
complexity of the programs involved."I1  The Whelan court also criticized
Synercom's differentiating the computer context from that of other literary
works, stating that Congress had made no such distinction. 19 Whelan went
on to confront Judge Higginbotham's central question posed in Synercom: if
structure is expression, then what is the underlying idea?120 The response
hinges on the definition of the idea in the particular case.' 2' The Whelan
court defined the idea as the efficient organization of a dental lab. The court
went on to find that many alternative program structures existed that could
express that idea. 122 Thus copyright protected the sequencing and ordering
of this particular program as expression did not merge with the underlying
idea.123
113. Id. ("The rule proposed here, which allows copyright protection beyond the literal
computer code, would provide the proper incentive for programmers by protecting their most
valuable efforts, while not giving them a stranglehold over the development of new computer
devices that accomplish the same end."). But see LaST Conference Report, supra note 4, at 20:
To the extent that the idea/expression distinction reflects a determination of the
level of competition desirable in regard to the subject matter under considera-
tion, as numerous courts have suggested, this formulation restricts competition
more broadly than would be the case even in regard to traditional works of art
and literature.
Id.
114. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1238 ("We are not convinced that progress in computer technol-
ogy or technique is qualitatively different from progress in other areas of science or the arts.").
115. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1238.
116. 462 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
117. Id. at 1013-14.
118. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1239 ("Synercom did not deal with precisely the same materials
at issue herein, but formats are structurally simple as compared to full programs and it may
therefore be distinguishable."). But consider why that would make a difference. By consider-
ing the added effort involved in creating the structure of a full program as opposed to merely
input formats, is the court using copyright to protect effort and not merely expression? See
Financial Information, Inc. v. Moody's Investors Serv., Inc., 808 F.2d 204, 207 (2d Cir. 1986)
(in reference to compilations, the statutory definition "requires that copyrightability not be
determined by the amount of effort the author expends, but rather by the nature of the final
result"), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 820 (1987).
119. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1240 ("To the extent that Synercom rested on the premise that
there was a difference between the copyrightabiity of sequence and form in the computer
context and in any other context, we think that it is incorrect.").
120. Id.; Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003,
1013 (N.D. Tex. 1978) ("[I]f sequencing and ordering are expression, what separable idea is
being expressed?").





2 No Protection of Structure, Sequence, and Organization: Synercom
and Plains Cotton
Two courts have refused to extend copyright protection to the structure,
sequence, and organization of programs. 124 The Synercom court held that
copyright did not protect the organization and structure of input formats in
a structural engineering program.125 The finding that the input formats con-
stituted expression formed the foundation of the court's decision. 126 The
court noted a difference in the protection of structure between the computer
and non-computer contexts.127 The structure, sequence, and organization 28
in a non-computer context constitutes purely stylistic expression. 129 In the
case of software, that structure, sequence, and organization constitute
idea. 130 The court also noted in dicta that protectible expression in the com-
puter context could exist, but only where the expression exhibits more crea-
tivity than required by the idea of structure and sequence.' 3 '
The Synercom court raised an enlightening analogy involving public pol-
icy and public benefits. 132 The following is a summary of the analogy. 133
An auto manufacturer chooses the figure-H pattern of a manual transmis-
sion for use in its automobile production. Many other alternative patterns to
the figure-H would serve equally well in operating the transmission system.
The original manufacturer photographs, describes, draws, and films the pat-
tern. Such photographs, descriptions, drawings, and films constitute expres-
sions of the pattern, and as such enjoy copyright protection. Other
manufacturers may also photograph, describe, draw, and film the pattern.
Copyright protects only expressions, including those of the competing
manufacturers. Copyright does not protect the pattern itself, for the pattern
is an idea. Thus the other manufacturers may use the pattern in their own
cars as they wish. Such widespread copying of the pattern would actually
enhance the value of the pattern by leading to standardization around that
pattern. Widespread use of the same design would have important social
benefits, as drivers could drive all automobiles built around that pattern after
having trained on only one.134 The benefits of standardization is what drove
124. Synercom, 462 F. Supp. at 1014 (merger of expression with idea in input formats);
Plains Cotton Coop. Ass'n v. Goodpasture Computer Serv., Inc., 807 F.2d 1256, 1262 (5th
Cir. 1987) (sequence and organization in case at bar dictated by external market), reh'g denied,
813 F.2d 407 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 821 (1987).
125. Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003, 1014
(N.D. Tex. 1978).
126. Id. at 1003.
127. Id. at 1014 ("[I]n the usual case sequence, choice, and arrangement have only stylistic
significance, rather than constituting as they would here, the essence of the expression.").
128. Referred to in Synercom as "sequence, choice and arrangement." Id.
129. Id.
130. Synercom, 462 F. Supp. at 1014.
131. Id. ("It would follow that only to the extent the expressions involve stylistic creativity
above and beyond the bare expression of sequence and arrangement, should they be protected."
(emphasis in original)).
132. Id. at 1013.
133. Id.
134. Id. ("Use of the same pattern might be socially desirable, as it would reduce the
retraining of drivers.... Admittedly there are many more possible choices of computer for-
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the Synercom court to its decision not to extend copyright protection.1 35
Following Synercom's reasoning, the court in Plains Cotton Cooperative
Association v. Goodpasture Computer Service, Inc. 136 also held that copyright
does not protect the structure, sequence, and organization of software.1 37
The defendants urged the court to adopt the holding in Whelan and reject
the premise that sequence and form in the computer context should receive
different treatment than in a non-computer context.' 38 The Plains Cotton
court expressly declined to protect the structure, sequence, and organization
of a program. 139 The court found two reasons for this action. First, the
record was only partially developed since the case reviewed denial of a mo-
tion for preliminary injunction."14 Second, the court found that market
forces mandated many of the similarities between the programs at bar.
14 1
To the extent that market forces dictated the structure used in the programs,
the doctrine of merger would preclude protection of that structure. 142
III. CURRENT LAW
Four recent cases have dealt with screen displays generated by pro-
grams. 143 Only Lotus Development Corp. v. Paperback Software Interna-
tional. 14 has specifically ruled on the copyrightability of the user interface.
All tend to support the position that copyright protection extends to the user
interface.
A. Broderbund Software v. Unison World
The court in Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc. 145 held that
audiovisual displays of a program constitute protectible expression under the
Act. 146 Though the court dealt primarily with the concept of audiovisual
mats, and the decision among them more arbitrary, but this does not detract from the force of
the analogy.")
135. See infra notes 308-331 and accompanying text.
136. 807 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir.) reh'g denied, 813 F.2d 407 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
821 (1987).




141. Plains Cotton, 807 F.2d at 1262.
142. The court of appeals did not actually go into great detail concerning its analysis. It
needed merely to review the record for an abuse of discretion of the trial judge. How the court
would have held had it had a complete record before it on appeal, and how important a role
the externalities of the market played in their decision, appears uncertain.
143. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990) (see
infra notes 213-301 and accompanying text); Manufacturers Technologies, Inc. v. CAMS, Inc.,
706 F. Supp. 984, 993 (D. Conn. 1989) (see infra notes 191-212 and accompanying text); Digi-
tal Communications Assocs., Inc. v. Softklone Distrib. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 449, 462-63 (N.D.
Ga. 1987) (see infra notes 160-90 and accompanying text); Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Uni-
son World, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1127, 1133 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (see infra notes 146-59 and accom-
panying text).
144. 740 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990).
145. 648 F. Supp. 1127 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
146. Id. at 1135 (Copyright extends to "the overall structure, sequence and arrangement of
the screens, text, and artwork (i.e., the audiovisual displays in general)").
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displays, it nonetheless discussed the principles involved in determining the
copyrightability of a user interface.147 The court reasoned that the audiovi-
sual displays were protected as pictorial or graphic works within section 102
of the Act. 148 The design of the displays grew out of aesthetic rather than
functional considerations. 149 The court considered the apparent conflict be-
tween the Whelan and Synercom decisions and chose to follow Whelan. 50
The Broderbund court, however, misinterpreted Whelan as standing for the
protection of audiovisual displays.' 5 '
The Broderbund court held that the ideas of the menu screens, input for-
mats, and sequencing of screens did not merge with the expression of those
ideas.152 The court pointed to the existence of a competing printing pro-
gram in rejecting the defendant's argument for merger.' 5 3 The court also
applied the rules and instructions doctrine. 5 4 If only a limited number of
possible expressions of an idea can exist, then copyright protects none of
those expressions. 15 Were protection allowed, one could copyright all pos-
sible expressions of an idea and effectively monopolize the idea.' 56 The
court held that the existence of an alternative expression of the idea 5 7 re-
futed the defendant's argument for the rules and instructions exception.' 58
The court further noted that the menu screens contained more than merely
instructions.159
147. See infra notes 148-59 and accompanying text.
148. Broderbund, 648 F. Supp. at 1134.
149. Id. (The displays were "dictated primarily by artistic and aesthetic considerations,
and not by utilitarian or mechanical ones."). But cf Curtis, Engineering Computer "Look and
Feel": User Interface Technology and Human Factors Engineering, 30 JURIMETRICS J. 51, 63
(1989) ("The design of user interfaces is a matter of engineering rather than art.").
150. Broderbund, 648 F. Supp. at 1133.
151. Id. The court concluded, "Whelan thus stands for the proposition that copyright
protection is not limited to the literal aspects of a computer program, but rather that it extends
to the overall structure of a program, including its audiovisual displays." (emphasis added).
Id. In fact, Whelan actually addressed the issue of format inputs, not screen displays. Whelan
held that "copyright protection of computer programs may extend beyond the programs' lit-
eral code to their structure, sequence, and organization. . . ." Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow
Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1248 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031
(1987). The court in Digital Communications Assocs., Inc. v. Softklone Distrib. Corp., 659 F.
Supp. 449, 455 (N.D. Ga. 1987), maintained that the Broderbund court apparently misread
Whelan as standing for the protection of audiovisual displays under the copyright in the un-
derlying program. Id. at 462-63. See infra notes 163, 197 and accompanying text.
152. Broderbund, 648 F. Supp. at 1132. See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text
covering merger.
153. Id. at 1132 ("[The existence of 'Stickybear Printer' proves that there do exist other,
quite different ways of expressing the ideas embodied in 'Print Shop.' ").
154. Id. at 1134 (citing Affiliated Hosp. Prod., Inc. v. Merdel Game Mfg. Co., 513 F.2d
1183 (2d Cir. 1975) and Decorative Aides Corp. v. Staple Sewing Aides Corp., 497 F. Supp.
154 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd, 657 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1981)). The rules and instructions doctrine
stems from the doctrine of merger. See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
155. Broderbund, 648 F. Supp. at 1134.
156. Id. ("[W]here an idea can be expressed in only a very limited number of ways, afford-
ing copyright protection to the rules or instructions would be tantamount to affording copy-
right protection to the games or processes themselves.").
157. The existence of an additional competing printing program was an alternative expres-
sion of the idea. Id. at 1132.
158. Id. at 1134.
159. Id. (The artwork, layout and sequencing "provides a significant element of entertain-
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B. Digital Communications v. Softklone
The Softkione court found infringement of an independently-copy-
righted' 0 status screen generated by a copyrighted program. Copyright
protection extended to the status screen as a literary work 161 and as a compi-
lation of command terms.1 62 The court rejected Broderbund's interpretation
of Whelan, stating instead that the Whelan court did not extend protection
of the underlying program to its screen displays.1 63 After considering Whe-
lan and Broderbund, the Sofiklone court held that the underlying program's
copyright did not protect the screen displays produced by that program. '
In the case at bar, the screen display enjoyed the protection of an independ-
ent copyright, 6 5 and thus did not need protection from the program's copy-
right anyway.
The Sofikione court considered the idea-expression dichotomy in its dis-
cussion of the status screen's copyrightability.166 Citing Whelan, the court
applied a test of necessity, in which everything not necessary to the idea or
purpose of the work constitutes expression.' 67 First one defines the idea un-
derlying the work.' 68 Then one determines whether the expression of the
status screen is necessary to that idea.' 69 The court found that the idea be-
hind the work lay in a screen that gives information about the program's
status and in a command system activated by two keys. 170 The expression
subsisted of the particular arrangement, capitalization, and highlighting of
the command terms in that screen. '7 ' If the defendants copied that unneces-
sary expression, the defendants took copyrightable expression.1
72
ment for the user (often a child)." Therefore the screens contain "stylistic creativity above and
beyond the bare expression" of rules or instructions and thus do not fall within the rules and
instructions exception.).
160. The screen display itself was registered with the Copyright Office. Prior to 1988 the
Copyright Office granted separate copyrights for screen displays and for the underlying pro-
gram, but now will issue only a single copyright that shall cover both the program and its
screen displays. See Registration Decision; Registration and Deposit of Computer Screen Dis-
plays, 53 Fed. Reg. 21,817 (1988).
161. Digital Communications Assocs., Inc. v. Softklone Distrib. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 449,
462 (N.D. Ga. 1987).
162. Id. at 463.
163. Id. at 455.
164. Id. (though the screen display itself could be separately copyrighted). A copyright in
an audiovisual screen display does confer copyright protection on the underlying program, as
the program is a copy of the screen, but not vice versa. Id. at 456 (citing M. Kramer Mfg. Co.
v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 442 (4th Cir. 1986)). Thus a program is a copy of its screen display,
but a screen display is not considered a copy of its underlying program. "This apparent anom-
aly is created because of the unusual nature of computers." Id. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988)
(effective Jan. 1, 1978) for a definition of "copy."
165. See supra note 160.
166. Softklone, 659 F. Supp. at 457-58.
167. Id. at 458.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 458-59 ("Thus, 'idea' is the process or manner by which the status screen, like
the car, operates and the 'expression' is the method by which the idea is communicated to the
user.") Id. at 458.
171. Softklone, 659 F. Supp. at 459.
172. Id. at 459-60. Note that had the defendant simply designed a keystroke-compatible
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The Softklone court also confronted the issue of merger. 173 If the devel-
oper could only express the underlying idea in one way, then clearly the
expression would merge with that idea. 174 Where expression merges with
idea, that expression receives no protection under copyright.175 Unlike in
Synercom, the defendant copied more than merely a format sequence neces-
sary to the idea. 176 Rather the defendant copied the arrangement, capitali-
zation, and highlighting of the command terms, 177 which were not necessary
to the underlying idea.178 Judge O'Kelley found that a developer could ex-
press the idea underlying the status screen in many substantially dissimilar
ways.1 79 The expression found in the original work was not necessary to the
underlying idea and did not merge with that idea.180
The court also rejected the argument that the status screen acted merely
as a blank form.18' Blank forms that do not impart information receive no
protection from copyright. 18 2 The fundamental concern behind the rule that
blank forms receive no protection relates to the doctrine of merger.18 3 The
law must beware of protecting a blank form for fear of protecting the under-
lying idea. 18 4 Such a determination must be made on a case-by-case basis. 185
program without significant aesthetic similarities, the court indicated in dicta that it would
have found no infringement. Id. at 460 (Had the defendants merely created a program "which
accepted all of the same commands utilized by the plaintiff,... there would have been only an
appropriation of the plaintiff's idea and not its expression.")
173. Id. at 457-60.
174. Id. at 458. See also supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
175. Id. at 457-58. See also supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
176. Softkione, 659 F. Supp. at 460. The court in Synercom found that the idea and expres-
sion of the sequence of input cards merged. Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Com-
puting Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003, 1013-14 (N.D. Tex. 1978) ("If sequencing and ordering is
expression, what separable idea is expressed?"). Many courts have cast doubt on the Synercom
decision, while a few have expressly declined to follow it. See Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow
Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987);
Manufacturers Technologies, Inc. v. CAMS, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 984, 993 (D. Conn. 1989). But
see Plains Cotton Coop. Ass'n v. Goodpasture Computer Serv., Inc., 807 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir.
1987) (following Synercom), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 821 (1987).
177. Softklone, 659 F. Supp. at 460.
178. Id. at 459.
179. Id. at 460. The court also noted that "the arrangement of the status screen involves
considerable stylistic creativity and authorship above and beyond the ideas embodied in the
status screen." Id.
180. Id. at 460.
181. Id. at 461-62. The Copyright Office defines a "blank form" as "time cards, graph
paper, account books, diaries, bank checks, score cards, address books, report form[s], order
forms and the like, which are designed for recording information and do not in themselves
convey information ...." Id. at 461 (citing 35 C.F.R. § 202.1(c)(19)).
182. See Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1243 (3d
Cir. 1986) ("Only those [blank forms or computer files] that by their arrangement and organi-
zation convey some information can be copyrighted."), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987). See
also John H. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966, 971 (11 th Cir. 1983) ("[B]lank
forms which do not convey information or contain original pictorial expression are not copy-
rightable."); Softklone, 659 F. Supp. at 461 ("[I]f the work provides the user information be-
yond simply indicating where to record data (Synercom implies even this alone may be
sufficient), then the work is copyrightable."); Synercom, 462 F. Supp. at 1011 (The "litmus
seems to be whether the material proffered for copyright undertakes to express.").
183. See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
184. Softklone, 659 F. Supp. at 462.
185. Id. at 461.
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Here the court ruled that the status screen, though it might be a form, none-
theless conveyed information. 186  The status screen, therefore, merited
protection. '8 7
Finally, the court rejected the policy argument for standardization in the
industry. 18 8 Citing Whelan, the court reasoned that its ruling maintained a
proper balance between incentive and public dissemination. 189 Judge
O'Kelley stressed that the holding granted no protection to the ideas of a
status screen, a command driven program, or of the particular command
terms used therein.190
C. Manufacturers Technologies v. CAMS
The court in Manufacturers Technologies, Inc. v. CAMS, Inc.,191 another
screen display case, ruled that copyright protection extended to screen dis-
plays in a cost estimation program. 192 Separate copyrights had been granted
to the screen displays. 193 The court noted that the difficulty stemmed from
the unique nature of software and the screen displays produced by pro-
grams.' 94 In reaching its decision the court first analyzed Broderbund and
Softklone.195
The CAMS court questioned the analysis in Broderbund,196 particularly
the apparent misinterpretation of Whelan 197 and failure to acknowledge the
unique nature of software. 198 The court also doubted the continuing validity
of Softklone, 199 as the Copyright Office had since modified its position re-
garding separate registration for display screens.2°°
In analyzing the copyrightability of the display screens, the court ad-
dressed the issues of the idea-expression dichotomy, merger, and blank
186. Id. at 462.
187. Id. ("Application of this principle [of protecting blank forms only where such protec-
tion would not give the copyright owner undue control over the underlying idea] to the plain-
tiff's status screen, which undisputably required substantial effort to author and which has
innumerable possible variations so that its copyrighting would not permit the plaintiff to mo-
nopolize its underlying ideas, argues for granting it copyright protection.").
188. Id.
189. Softklone, 659 F. Supp. at 462 ("[T]he proper balance of protection and communica-
tion supports the copyrightability of the status screen arrangement and design").
190. Id.
191. 706 F. Supp. 984 (D.Conn. 1989).
192. Id. at 996.
193. Id. at 988.
194. Id. at 991. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
195. Id. at 992-93.
196. CAMS, 706 F. Supp. at 992-93.
197. Id. at 992 (In holding that the existence of a third printing program meant that
"there existed expression embodied in the menu screens separable from the idea of the plain-
tiff's program," the Broderbund court "overextended the scope of copyright protection appli-
cable to those screen displays."). See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
198. Id. at 992-93 ("Such an approach [adopted in Broderbund] ignores the fact recog-
nized by both the Whelan and Softklone courts that more than one computer program can
produce virtually the same screen display."). See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
199. Id. at 992.
200. Id. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
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forms.20 1 The creation of display screens formatted for maximum ease of
use constituted the idea.20 2 The court focused on the question of what ele-
ments of expression fell within the boundaries of copyright. 20 3 Much of the
expression found in the screens fell outside of those boundaries because of
merger.204 The developer had few alternatives in choosing the uniform
screen format205 and the internal method of navigation through the
screens.2°6 As the potential existed for monopolizing the idea, these expres-
sion protection did not extend to.20 7
One aspect of expression protected by the court was the status screen.203
Copyrightable elements included: the selection of items to monitor, the ar-
rangement of those items, the assignment of numbers to individual depart-
ments, and the manner in which the status screen evolved as the user
advanced through the steps of the program. 209 The court also classified a
job identification screen as copyrightable, as the screen gave information to
the user beyond what was necessary to express the idea.210 The court re-
jected the blank form argument concerning this screen, again because it con-
veyed information.211 An alphabetical, two-column display of departments
and several lists failed to meet the requirements for protection, as their ex-
pression merged with the idea.21 2
D. Lotus Development v. Paperback Software International
In Lotus Development Corp. v. Paperback Software Int' 2 13 the court held
that the structure, sequence, and organization of a menu structure falls
201. CAMS, 706 F. Supp. at 994-98.
202. Id. at 995.
203. Id. at 994-98.
204. Id. at 995-96.
205. Id. at 995 ("[T]he plaintiff has adopted conventions from a very narrow range of
possibilities").
206. CAMS, 706 F. Supp. at 995.
[T]he idea at issue, the process or manner of navigating internally on any spe-
cific screen displays likewise is limited in the number of ways it may be simply
achieved to facilitate user comfort. To give the plaintiff copyright protection for
this aspect of its screen displays, would come dangerously close to allowing it to
monopolize a significant portion of the easytouse internal navigational conven-
tions for computers.
Id.
207. Id. See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
208. Id. at 996.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 997.
211. CAMS, 706 F. Supp. at 997.
First, it [the display screen in question] suggests that identifying a job entails
more than just naming the prospective purchaser or person requesting the esti-
mate as is evidenced by the identification of a job number, part number, part
name, and customer name. Second, it suggests to the user ... that certain
attributes of the part to be manufactured need to be considered when identifying
a particular job, because those attributes will affect the derivation of an estimate.
For these reasons, this screen display contains expression and is therefore, [sic]
subject to copyright protection.
Id.
212. Id. at 996-97.
213. 740 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990).
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within the scope of copyright protection. 2 14 Lotus is the first case decided
directly on the basis of the copyrightability of the user interface.2 15 The
outcome of a series of pending cases may depend on this court's holding.
2 16
The Constitution authorizes Congress to grant authors limited monopolies
for the promotion of progress.21 7 Congress exercised this authority in creat-
ing the Act. 21 8 Congress neither mentioned protection of user interfaces in
the Act, nor amended the Act to cover the subject. Clearly, however, Con-
gress could protect such nonliteral elements if it chose to do so. 2 19 In inter-
preting the Act, the Lotus court considered three factors: the language of
the law, the provisions of the law taken as a whole, and the object and policy
behind the law.220
The Lotus court found that the Act requires the use of the idea-expression
distinction as the primary test for copyrightability. 22 1 The court rejected the
applicability of a test based on the literal-nonliteral distinction proposed by
Paperback Software. 222 The court maintained that the idea-expression test
is consistent with the treatment of useful articles223 and of nonliteral ele-
ments of expression in music, drama, literature, and film. 224 The court also
ruled that the user interface, as well as other nonliteral aspects of computer
programs, does not constitute a mere useful article. 225 Such a finding com-
plies with the objectives and policies of copyright law. 2 2 6
The Lotus court questioned Synercom's continuing validity.227  Two
courts
2 2 8 had already expressly rejected Synercom's central proposition.229
The court also noted a number of other cases that extended copyright pro-
214. Id. at 68.
215. The user interface includes the structure and organization of the menu system, its
command terms, their structure and order, their display in the screen, the use of function keys,
and the macro command system. Id. at 63. The court held that screen displays are different.
"I emphatically reject defendants' premise, based on yet another word game, that equates the
user interface of 1-2-3 with 1-2-3's 'screen displays.'" Id. at 79. CAMS, Softklone, and
Broderbund dealt with screen displays. Whelan, SAS, Synercom and Plains Cotton involved
the structure, sequence, and organization of program code.
216. See supra note 14.
217. Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 46. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
218. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1988 & Supp. 1989).
219. Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 46 ("The central question is not whether Congress could render
nonliteral elements such as those of [Lotus] 1-2-3 copyrightable, but whether it has done so.").
220. Id. at 46-47.
221. Id. at 53-54.
222. Id. at 54.
223. Id.
224. Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 54.
225. Id. at 54 ("articles having an intrinsic utilitarian function").
226. Id. ("[To encourage the creation and dissemination of new ideas by protecting, for
limited times, the specific way that an author has expressed those ideas.") (emphasis in
original).
227. Id. at 55.
228. See Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1248 (3d
Cir. 1986) ("copyright protection of computer programs may extend beyond the programs'
literal code to their structure, sequence and organization... "), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031
(1987); Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, 648 F. Supp. 1127, 1133 (N.D. Cal. 1986)
("copyright protection is not limited to the literal aspects of a computer program, but rather
•.. it extends to the overall structure of a program, including its audiovisual displays.").
229. Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 55 (Interpreting the holding in Synercom as "the expression of
10671991]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
tection beyond the literal computer code.230 The court reasoned that since
the creation of a program's interface requires more creativity and intellectual
work than the actual coding, protecting only the code would overly limit the
amount of protection given to software. 231 Such a result would yield noth-
ing more than trade secret protection for nonliteral elements, which provides
a very short period of protection.232 This would conflict with mandates of
copyright law.233
The defendants argued that the copyright does not protect the interface
due to the useful nature of the interface. 234 The defendants introduced the
gear shift analogy from Synercom, 235 the standardized layout of the
QWERTY keyboard, and the configuration of the controls in musical instru-
ments in support of their argument that the interface was only a useful pat-
tern.236 The court rejected this argument, stating that copyright extends to
expression contained in a useful article so long as that expression is in-
dependent and separable from the functional idea.237 The mere fact that an
article may be useful does not render it ineligible for copyright protection. 238
The Lotus court declined to use the concepts of look and feel or total
concept and feel in making its decision of copyrightability. 239 The court
emphasized that total concept and feel applies to the test for substantial simi-
larity, not for copyrightability. 240 Furthermore, the court noted that look
and feel is a conclusion and does not lend itself well to application as a test in
itself.241 The Lotus court declined to offer a bright-line test for copyright-
ability, relying instead on a scale of abstractions. 242 The abstractions test
involves simultaneously weighing three factors: the definition of the under-
lying idea,243 the distinction between essential and nonessential expressions
nonliteral sequence and order is inseparable from the idea and accordingly is not
copyrightable").
230. Id. at 55. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
231. Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 56.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 54-58.
235. Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 55. See supra notes 132-35 and accompanying text.
236. Id. at 55.
237. Id. at 58-59.
Elements of expression, even if embodied in useful articles, are copyrightable
if capable of identification and recognition independently of the functional ideas
that make the article useful.
If, however, the expression of an idea has elements that go beyond all func-
tional elements of the idea itself, and beyond the obvious, and if there are nu-
merous other ways of expressing the noncopyrightable idea, then those elements
of expression, if original and substantial, are copyrightable. ...
Id. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
238. Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 56-58.
239. Id. at 62-63.
240. Id. at 63 (citing Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1109 (9th
Cir. 1970)); Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prod., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157,
1161, 1167 n.9 (9th Cir. 1977).
241. Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 63.
242. Id. at 60-61.
243. Id. at 60.
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of that idea,2 " and the determination of whether the nonessential expres-
sions constitute a substantial part of the original work.245 A survey of these
three factors is essential to understanding the test.
1. Defining the Idea
First, the decisionmaker must define the idea underlying the work.2"
Without such a delineation one could not distinguish between the public
domain idea and the copyrightable expression. 247 In determining where the
elusive line between idea and expression lies, the court relied upon Judge
Learned Hand's method developed sixty years ago in Nichols v. Universal
Pictures Corp. 248 The method involved conceiving of the work in patterns of
increasing generality, from the most specific set of details to the most general
idea underlying the work.249 At some point between the two extremes, the
pattern could no longer be protected without monopolizing the idea. 250
However, this determination must be made on a case-by-case basis, as that
point is different in every case.251
The user interface consists of five elements: the menus, the long prompts,
the display screens, the function keys, and the macro language.252 The
structure, sequence, and organization of the menus were determinative in the
court's determination of infringement.25 3 In applying Learned Hand's test
the court listed several examples of spreadsheet programs and stated that
they all express the same basic idea of an electronic spreadsheet, though each
is quite different in structure, appearance, and method of operation.254 This
most general level, that of a simple electronic spreadsheet with nothing
more, dwells in the realm of the uncopyrightable idea. 255 The court men-
tions three different programs that share this idea, all of which vary widely
in their expression.256
2. Identifying Nonessential Expression
Second, the decision maker must distinguish essential and nonessential ex-
pression. 257 A number of examples serve to illustrate the court's reasoning
244. Id. at 61.
245. Id.
246. Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 60.
247. See supra notes 48-62 and accompanying text.
248. 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930).
249. Id. at 121.
250. Id.
251. Id. ("Nobody has ever been able to fix that boundary, and nobody ever can."). In
Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960), Learned
Hand stated: "Obviously, no principle can be stated as to when an imitator has gone beyond
copying the 'idea,' and has borrowed its 'expression.' Decisions must therefore inevitably be
ad hoc." Id.
252. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 63 (D. Mass. 1990).
253. Id. at 68.
254. Id. at 65.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 66.
257. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 61 (D. Mass. 1990)
("whether an alleged expression of the idea is limited to elements essential to expression of that
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in this part of the test. The L-shaped design of the programs involved is one
of a limited number of possible expressions of the idea of an electronic
spreadsheet and thus receives no copyright protection.258 Similarly, the
designation of a certain key to invoke the menu system fails the test, as only
a limited number of reasonable and easily accessible alternatives exist.259
The court also held uncopyrightable the use of certain keys to designate
mathematical operations as essential elements to the idea of an electronic
spreadsheet. 260 Judge Keeton found these examples present in most expres-
sions of the idea. 261
The structure, sequence, and organization of the menu structure do not
constitute elements essential to the idea. 262 The court found the idea under-
lying the structure of a menu in an electronic spreadsheet capable of expres-
sion in many ways. 263 Thus Lotus' expression of a spreadsheet was not
essential to the underlying idea. 264 The decision maker must look at the
menu structure as a whole.265 Copyrightability may stand despite the
noncopyrightability of particular components or terms.266 The court then
found that 1-2-3's menu structure satisfied the second part of the test, in that
1-2-3's menu structure was not essential to the idea of an electronic
spreadsheet. 267
idea (or is one of only a few ways of expressing the idea) or instead includes identifiable ele-
ments of expression not essential to every expression of that idea").
258. Id. at 66.
259. Id. ("this expression merges with the idea of having a readily available method of
invoking the menu command system").
260. Id. at 66-67.
261. Id. at 67.
262. Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 67 (D. Mass. 1990). Other aspects of these programs, however,
need not be present in every expression of an electronic spreadsheet. An example of distinctive
details of expression is the precise structure, sequence, and organization of the menu command
system. Id. at 68.
263. Id.
This particular expression of a menu structure is not essential to the electronic
spreadsheet idea, nor does it merge with the somewhat less abstract idea of a
menu structure for an electronic spreadsheet. The idea of a menu structure-
including the overall structure, the order of commands in each menu line, the
choice of letters, words, or "symbolic tokens" to represent each command, the
presentation of these symbolic tokens on the screen (Le., first letter only, abbre-
viations, full words, full words with one or more letters capitalized or under-
lined), the type of menu system used (i.e., one, two, or three-line moving-cursor
menus, pull-down menus, or command-driven interfaces), and the long
prompts"-could be expressed in a great many if not literally unlimited number
of ways.
Id. Judge Keeton continued, "I conclude that a menu command structure is capable of being
expressed in many if not an unlimited number of ways, and that the command structure of 1-2-
3 is an original and nonobvious way of expressing a command structure." Id. at 68.
264. See supra note 263 and accompanying text.
265. Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 67 ("[T]he court need only identify those elements that are
copyrightable, and then determine whether those elements, considered as a whole, have been
impermissibly copied.") (citing Atari Games Corp. v. Oman, 888 F.2d 878, 882-83 (D.C. Cir.
1989)) (emphasis in original).
266. Id. at 67.
267. Id. at 68 ("Accordingly, the menu structure, taken as a whole-including the choice
of command terms, the structure and order of those terms, their presentation on the screen,
and the long prompts-is an aspect of 1-2-3 that is not present in every expression of an
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3. Measuring the Substantiality of the Nonessential Expression
Third, the decisionmaker must determine whether identified nonessential
.elements constitute a qualitatively or quantitatively substantial part of the
original work.268 The court found with little difficulty that the structure,
sequence, and organization of the 1-2-3 menu interface formed a substantial
part of the work. 269 The court noted as well that the defendant's efforts in
copying the interface reinforced its finding of substantiality.270 Having con-
sidered the three factors, Judge Keeton held the structure, sequence, and
organization of the 1-2-3 user interface to be protected under copyright.
271
4. Policy Considerations
The court in Lotus pointed out that while it must observe the object and
policy behind the law, a court must nonetheless take care not to ignore ex-
press or implied mandates of the law.272 The defendant set forth three pol-
icy-based arguments against protection of the user interface.273 First, the
industry needs a bright-line rule to avoid uncertainty. 274 Second, developers
must have the ability to borrow the expression of others in the computer
industry. 275 Third, the public would benefit most from compatibility and
standardization in the industry.276
a. Bright-Line Rule for Infringement of User Interfaces
The need for a bright-line rule argument stems from the potential uncer-
tainty that would arise out of a case-by-case determination of infringement
in interfaces.277 The lack of certainty in the industry due to the absence of a
bright-line rule could have detrimental effects on the innovation and devel-
opment of better software.278 The court rejected this argument, reasoning
that it was for Congress, not the court, to draw such a bright-line rule, and it
chose not do So. 2 7 9
In a similar vein, the defendants also argued that the circumstances had
changed since the last computer amendment passed in 1980.280 They intro-
electronic spreadsheet. It meets the requirements of the second element of the legal test for
copyrightability.").
268. Id. at 61.
269. Id. at 68 ("The user interface of 1-2-3 is its most unique element, and is the aspect that
has made 1-2-3 so popular.").
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 71.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 73.
275. Id. at 77.
276. Id. at 73-77.
277. Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 73 ("Software developers would like to know what they may
and what they must not copy.").
278. Id.
279. Id. ("Congress could have constitutionally drawn defendants' proposed bright-line,
providing protection only to computer program code and not to nonliteral elements of com-
puter programs, but Congress has not done so.").
280. Id. at 73-74.
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duced expert testimony concerning the potentially disastrous effects of pro-
tecting the user interface under copyright. 28 1 The testimony suggested that
protection of interfaces and file formats would detrimentally affect the
American software industry by slowing innovation. 28 2 The court also al-
lowed Lotus to introduce testimony to the contrary, which asserted that
strong copyright protection benefitted the industry. 28 3 The court stated that
it excluded all of this evidence from its consideration of the case. 284 The
court declared considering such testimony would lie beyond the scope of its
authority.28 5 In addition, the court felt that the defendants failed to show a
significant change in the facts upon which Congress based its enactment of
the law.
2 86
b. OTSOG (On the Shoulders of Giants) 287
Defendants further argued that, especially in the field of user interfaces,
281. Id.
282. Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 74.
I believe that such a decision would throw the entire software industry into
confusion.... [T]here would be a chilling effect on development and advance-
ment in many areas....
This case has implications about whether or not new, improved programs can
read and execute data users created for themselves with an older program. The
quantity of data to be affected by this decision is incomprehensively vast. It is
not a case about "cheap copies."
If aspects of screen displays that are governed by functionality (such as a
command language like the 1-2-3 command structure) are held to be within the
scope of copyright protection, then progress in application and systems com-
puter programs could be dramatically slowed in the United States.
Id. The court also cited a survey of user interface designers that indicated that they oppose
strong protection from copyright, and that they feel that such protection would hurt, rather
than help the software industry. Id. (citing Samuelson & Glushko, Comparing the Views of
Lawyers and User Interface Designers on the Software Copyright "Look and Feel" Lawsuits, 30
JURIMETRICS J. 121, 137 (1989)).
283. Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 75.
[T]he tremendous growth and success of the U.S. software industry is the direct
result of the creative and original efforts of its software developers, laboring
under the protection of the copyright laws. Innovation has been the key to mar-
ket success ....
It is no accident that the world's strongest software industry is found in the
United States, rather than in some other jurisdiction which provides weaker pro-
tection for computer programs. The system is working, and there is no reason
to change it.
Id. The court also cited A. CLAPES, SOFTWARE, COPYRIGHT & COMPETITION: THE "LOOK
AND FEEL" OF THE LAW 202-03 (1989) (userinterface requires strong copyright protection to
encourage innovation and progress). Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 75.
284. Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 74-75 ("courts are free to consider 'evidence' of this type when
deciding 'legislative' (or 'premise') facts.").
285. Id. at 76.
I conclude that a court would be going well beyond even the precedents most
receptive to consideration of legislative history if it took into account expert
opinions of persons experienced in the field of computer software development
that are manifestly inconsistent with the accommodation that Congress struck
when it enacted the Copyright Act of 1976 and the most recent amendments of
the copyright law.
Id.
286. Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 76.
287. Id. at 77 (it is a well-established doctrine that authors may build upon prior work and
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developers need to have the capability to borrow expression from other de-
velopers' works.288 Such borrowing is indispensable to continued innovation
and progress. 289 The court agreed in principle that the OTSOG principle
was alive and well in intellectual property, but disagreed in its application to
expression. 290 OTSOG applies only to ideas, and that alone should provide
sufficient basis for further innovation, even in the user interface field.291
Where expression merged with the idea, however, the expression could not
of course be copyrighted. 292 The case of the L-shaped design element of an
electronic spreadsheet provides an example of expression merged with
idea. 293
c. Standardization and Compatibility
The court also rejected the argument that the need for standardization in
the computer industry weighs against granting copyright protection to the
user interface.294 The defendants unsuccessfully argued that their program
had to be keystroke compatible with the Lotus 1-2-3 program in order to
have a chance of commercial success.295 The court pointed to a competitor
to 1-2-3 that did not use the same interface or menu structure but which
nonetheless enjoyed commercial success. 296 The competitor was able to im-
port and export 1-2-3 compatible files and use a conversion utility to convert
1-2-3 macros into its own proprietary macro language.297 The court rea-
innovation in order to further the "Progress of Science and useful Arts." The phrase derives
from Newton, who said "If I have seen further it is by standing on ye sholders of Giants.").
288. Id.
289. Id. ("Copyrightability of a user interface, they argue, will frustrate the public interest
in allowing programmers to achieve innovation by 'borrowing' and improving upon ideas of
other programmers ... .
290. Id. at 78.
291. Lotus. 740 F. Supp. at 78.
It is sufficient that programmers are privileged to borrow and improve upon
previous ideas--such as the ideas for an electronic spreadsheet and a two-line
moving cursor menu. Adequate room for innovation remains even though suc-
cessors are barred from copying earlier authors' particular expressions-such as
the particular structure, sequence, and organization of a menu command
system.
Id. See also Pearl Sys., Inc. v. Competition Elec., Inc., 8 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1520, 1525 (S.D.
Fla. 1988), cited in Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 78.
292. See supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text.
293. Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 78.
294. Id. at 78-79.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 78 (referring to Microsoft Excel).
297. Microsoft Excel uses a different interface and different commands, but it does not run
on the lower-power computers that comprised the main base of installed machines like 1-2-3
and VP Planner do. The author finds fault with the court's reasoning in that Excel, the pri-
mary example used by the court to illustrate an alternative noninfringing expression of the idea
of an electronic spreadsheet, is nonetheless not a true alternative. Lotus 1-2-3 and VP-Planner
are character or text-based programs, which rely on and are limited by the symbols built into
the computer, of which there are only 128 (similar to the keys found on a keyboard or type-
writer, plus basic line drawing symbols). Thus there exist substantial limitations to the
number of possible ways of expressing the idea of an electronic spreadsheet, at least in terms of
screen displays.
Excel, on the other hand, is a graphics-based program, which creates its screen display as a
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soned that not protecting a product because it was good enough to become a
de facto standard would pervert the law of copyright. 298 Denying protection
in such a case would fly in the face of one purpose of copyright, the encour-
agement of innovation. 29 The court also indicated that the defendants had
alternatives other than marketing a competing look-alike spreadsheet with-
out license from Lotus. 3°° Furthermore, the court stated that no precedent
or statute supported the proposition that the public would benefit from
standardization. 30
IV. ANALYSIS AND PROPOSAL
A. Copyright Protection Currently Extends to the Structure, Sequence,
and Organization of the User Interface.
The precedent facing a court today calls for the protection of the struc-
ture, sequence, and organization of the user interface. 302 The Broderbund
court protected the interface as an audiovisual display. 30 3 The Sofikione
court found infringement of a status screen protected by a separate copy-
right.304 The CAMS court allowed the protection of display screens under a
program's copyright. 305 The Lotus court held the structure, sequence, and
organization of a menu system to be copyrightable. 30 6 The Act neither re-
picture composed of as many as 256,000 pixels (dots on the screen). The great burden of
calculating the positioning and coloration of all of the pixels falls on the microprocessor of the
computer. For this reason, Excel is only able to function properly on "AT" or compatible
computers. Until fairly recently, the AT type computers were far outnumbered by the lesser
"XT" type machines. Such lower-powered XT machines, though unable to run Excel, could
run 1-2-3, VP-Planner, or any of the other programs mentioned by the court. Had the distinc-
tion between graphics and text-based programs been clearly drawn for the court, the concept
of merger might have played a greater role.
This author would argue that one should distinguish between the idea of text-based and a
graphics-based electronic spreadsheets. Should such a distinction be made, one could well
argue, at least in terms of screen displays (which were discussed by the Lotus court in its
consideration of structure, sequence and organization, Id. at 80), that the number of possible
expressions is in fact limited. The doctrine of merger would argue against allowing the protec-
tion of an expression where the number of possible expressions is limited (see supra notes 63-68
and accompanying text), as perhaps the ten or twenty spreadsheets have monopolized the
expression of a text-based electronic spreadsheet.
298. Id. at 79. "Copyright protection would be perverse if it only protected mundane in-
crements while leaving unprotected as part of the public domain those advancements that are
more strikingly innovative." Id.
299. Id. ("both the text and history of the copyright law manifest a purpose of encourag-
ing innovation and of doing so through copyright protection.").
300. Id. at 78 (alternatives included using conversion utilities to maintain macro compati-
bility, seeking a license from Lotus to use the menu structure (perhaps not very feasible),
offering to sell their improvements to Lotus for future versions of 1-2-3, or selling VP-Planner
as an add-in to 1-2-3.).
301. Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 79.
302. See supra notes 213-301 and accompanying text (Lotus); supra notes 160-190 and ac-
companying text (CAMS); supra notes 160-190 and accompanying text (Softlkone); supra notes
146-159 and accompanying text (Broderbund); supra notes 97-123 and accompanying text
(Whelan).
303. See supra notes 146-59 and accompanying text.
304. See supra notes 160-90 and accompanying text.
305. See supra notes 191-212 and accompanying text.
306. See supra notes 213-301 and accompanying text.
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jects nor supports an interpretation calling for such protection. 30 7
B. Copyright Protection Should Not Extend to the Structure, Sequence,
and Organization of a Program's User Interface.
Although copyright currently protects the user interface, it should not do
so.308 The public would benefit from increased compatibility and standardi-
zation in the software industry. 3°9 Compatibility refers to products that
work easily with one another.310 Compatibility exists, for example, where
one program can read the files created by a different program. Standardiza-
tion means building compatible products.311 Producing programs that can
307. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1988) (effective Jan. 1, 1978).
308. See Farrell, supra note 96 ("TIhe user interface, the format for data storage and
transmission, and other relatively arbitrary aspects that must be standardized in order to
achieve compatibility benefits, should be unprotected, so that other software developers are
encouraged to achieve standardization."). See also Jacobs, supra note 3, at 104 ("Copyright
law should not require vendors to arbitrarily change the interfaces simply to avoid intellectual
property disputes."); Samuelson & Glushko, Survey on the Look and Feel of Lawsuits, COM-
MUNICATIONS OF THE ACM, May 1990, at 483:
More than 80 percent of the 667 respondents to the survey opposed copyright
protection for the look and feel of user interfaces, although they strongly sup-
ported copyright protection for source and object code. They regard the kind of
strong copyright protection being sought in the current look and feel lawsuits as
likely to have a negative effect on their own work and on the user interface
design community and industry. They oppose strong copyright protection for
user interfaces because they think such protection would adversely affect the
climate of open exchange and discussion of research and design innovations that
has brought progress to the field.
In the case of user interfaces, the CHI [Computer-Human Interaction] survey
clearly demonstrates that a significant segment of the leading designers and re-
searchers in the user interface field are overwhelmingly opposed to strong copy-
right protection for user interfaces and regard such protection as likely to be
harmful to the field, rather than helpful. These are the very people whom the
copyright law is supposed to be encouraging to be creative.
Id. at 483, 487 (emphasis added). See also Damman, Copyright of Computer Display Screens:
Summary and Suggestions, 9 COMPUTER L.J. 417, 445 (1989) (recommending a rebuttable
presumption of noncopyrightability for the structure, sequence, and organization of the user
interface); Samuelson & Glushko, supra note 282, at 122 (describing in detail the exact results
of the survey). Cf Kapor, Litigation vs. Innovation, BYTE, Sept. 1990, at 520; Spector, supra
note 85, at 88 ("Program and user interfaces are so important to software reusability that I
argue for relatively little protection of them. Protecting the code that implements the interface
should be sufficient to provide reward to the interface designer.").
If you want to keep this industry as vibrant and successful as it's been, then a
properly constructed intellectualproperty [sic] policy will respect protection but
give preference to innovation. Overprotection of intellectual property is as per-
nicious as underprotection in its stifling effects on innovation and the consequent
loss to society.
Kapor, supra, at 520. Cf also Note, Protecting the Look, supra note 3, at 578 ("Legislation is
needed to supplement copyright, patent, and other laws to fashion protection for the look and
feel of computer programs that meets [sic] the requirements of the industry.") The author
went on to present a proposal for separate legislation designed for the unique problems associ-
ated with the user interface. Id. at 579-86. See also Note, supra note 49, at 1154 ("Should
each developer have to design a unique user interface, use of computers will become needlessly
complex, seriously impairing the very productivity that computers are designed to enhance.").
309. See generally Jacobs, supra note 3; Farrell, supra note 96.




all read and write a certain file format reflects standardization.312 Standardi-
zation also means using the same command structure so as to reduce the
need for retraining. Protection of the user interface obstructs compatibility
and standardization. Protection in this context thus runs contrary to public
interest.
Without compatibility, today's computer user becomes locked into a spe-
cific vendor's application.31 3 For example, the user spends tremendous
amounts of time, effort, and money to learn to use an application. The user
may also create macros within the application to increase efficiency. The
user may build stores of data and information in files created by the applica-
tion. Protected by copyright laws, the vendor's proprietary interface effec-
tively restricts that user to utilizing only that vendor's application. The time
and money spent developing macros in one application would be wasted if
the user were to change to a noncompatible application. The user would
have to unlearn old commands and learn new ones if the user interfaces
shared little in common.
Given the user's tremendous investment in time, money, and effort, even a
more efficient and productive program would be unlikely to sway the user
from his current application, unless they shared similar interfaces. A com-
peting program having a similar user interface would allow the user to de-
cide between the products on the basis of their productivity, efficiency, and
features. Keystroke compatibility would ensure macro compatibility. 314
Without such a common interface, the user would most likely continue using
the first vendor's product, even if far inferior to its competition, in an effort
to preserve her investment.315
Allowing similar user interfaces would foster competition, control prices,
and spur further innovation.316 Vendors would not have to overcome the
user's training investment in a proprietary interface. Users could employ the
most efficient programs, thus maximizing productivity. Products would be-
come more available to the public as competition drove prices down. The
initial development costs entailed in designing a new interface, while signifi-
cant, would not outweigh the benefits of being the first on the market with a
312. Id.
313. Id. at 38 ("[T]he lack of standards can "lock in" users to a single vendor, creating a
degree of what has been called 'ex post monopoly.' ").
314. Many macro languages use the first letter of the represented menu command to exe-
cute that function when the macro runs.
315. See Jacobs, supra note 3, at 99 ("As computing power is disseminated further
throughout enterprises and corporations, the investment in training in the user interface be-
comes an increasingly important component of the enterprise's competitive advantage.").
316. Cf Farrell, supra note 96, at 36.
Standards have other, indirect benefits. For instance, the more people use a
given computer operating system, the more software is likely to be written for
that system, and the more choice and competition those users will have avail-
able. In addition, entry, competition, and innovation may be easier if a competi-
tor need only produce a single better component, which can then hook up to the
market range of complementary components, than if each innovator must de-
velop an entire "system."
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new product.317 The increased competition would spur vendors to make
even more innovative products in order to compete. 318
Denying copyright protection to the user interface would entail benefits to
developers and end users alike.31 9 Strong protection requires developers to
carefully avoid creating any resemblance to competing products.320  The
cost of developing a new and nonsimilar interface for every program of every
product line increases the costs paid by consumers. If protection were with-
held from the interface, then developers would not need to expend resources
reinventing the wheel. Most programs derive their origins at least in part
from other programs a.3
2
The protection of interfaces has the potential for undesirable effects.
322
Copyright law does not protect ideas, functions, or processes. 323 Yet where
a program becomes a de facto standard, protection of its interface could
create a de facto monopoly on the underlying idea or function.
324
For example, suppose a seventy per cent majority of users have trained in
using program X. They have invested valuable time and effort in this train-
ing. No other program may use a similar interface to that found in program
X. Due to the exorbitant cost of retraining, the majority users will not
change programs. The minority users employing other programs find them-
317. See infra note 329 and accompanying text.
318. See Jacobs, supra note 3, at 102 ("Independent development [where a compatible
product is independently developed], moreover, will lead to innovations in implementation, in
the quality and reliability of the code, in its performance, and in its cost.").
319. See, e.g., Grossman, Programmers Protest Lotus 'Look and Feel' Victory; League for
Programming Freedom Protests at Lotus Corp. Headquarters, PC WEEK, August 6, 1990, at
125 ("Common user interfaces are good for both users and programmers, allowing users to
learn a common set of commands and programmers to concentrate on the substantive compo-
nents of their programs instead of worrying about infringing on another company's interface
design."). But see, Lemberg (chief counsel for Lotus Dev. Corp.), quoted in Reinhardt, The
Lotus Case: Judge Rules User Interface is Protected by Copyright, BYTE, Sept. 1990, at 19, 20:
We see it [the judgement for Lotus] as a great victory for innovation because it
provides a framework that allows people to invest in engineering and be pro-
tected enough to recover their investments .... If the law protected the right of
a programmer to copy the de facto standard, then there would be no need to
innovate.
Id. at 20.
320. See Jacobs, supra note 3, at 104 ("Copyright law should not require vendors to arbi-
trarily change the interfaces simply to avoid intellectual property disputes.").
321. Lotus derived 1-2-3 from Visicalc, and Apple developed its Macintosh interface from
the Xerox Star system.
322. See Samuelson & Glushko, supra note 308, at 487.
If each software firm had to develop a different style of user interface to comply
with copyright law, there is concern that copyright might impede how those in
the user interface field do their work, might harm the health of the industry, and
might make more difficult the achievement of the goal of making computers
usable by ordinary people.
Id.
323. See supra note 308 and accompanying text.
324. LaST Conference Report, supra note 4, at 28 ("If the original program becomes
widely adopted, the interface may become a de facto standard. Copyright protection of the
original interface may then confer a de facto monopoly on the function performed by the
program, analogous to a copyright on the standard 'QWERTY' typewriter keyboard."). See
also Farrell, supra note 96, at 38 ("[The lack of standards can 'lock in' users to a single
vendor, creating a degree of what has been called 'ex post monopoly.' ").
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selves out of the mainstream of compatibility. Yielding to pressures to join
the standard and reap the benefits of such standardization, the minority
adopt program X. Thus program X enjoys not only the exclusive use of its
original expression, but also a monopoly on the underlying idea.325
Protection of the user interface could also inhibit the continued growth of
the software industry. 326 Larger firms such as Lotus and Ashton-Tate can
threaten smaller firms with expensive lawsuits. As courts decide infringe-
ment on a case-by-case basis,327 developers do not know how far they can
go. This uncertainty in the industry could discourage or retard new innova-
tion. Furthermore, large firms seeing their market share lost to smaller com-
petitors may regard litigation as an alternative to competing in the
marketplace. 328 Instead of a proliferation of innovative and competing
products, one might find a limited selection of bloated major name programs
bristling with protective measures.
The constitutional purposes of copyright will not suffer for lack of protec-
tion of the user interface. The law would still guard against the copying of
any program code. Developers would continue to generate new and ever
more innovative products, though others could copy their interfaces. To the
extent that a standard is developed, allowing others to produce similar inter-
325. LaST Conference Report, supra note 4, at 28.
326. See Bricklin testimony quoted in Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F.
Supp. 37, 74 (D. Mass. 1990).
If the law is interpreted to say that a developer may not make a new program
that can use the data files and inputs accepted by existing programs, then com-
puter advancement as we know it will be slowed....
I believe that such a decision would throw the entire software industry into
confusion .... iThere would be a chilling effect on development and advance-
ment in many areas ....
This case has implications about whether or not new, improved programs can
read and execute data users created for themselves with an older program. The
quantity of data to be affected by this decision is incomprehensively vast. It is
not a case about "cheap copies."
If aspects of screen displays that are governed by functionality (such as a
command language like the 1-2-3 command structure) are held to be within the
scope of copyright protection, then progress in application and systems com-
puter programs could be dramatically slowed in the United States.
Id.
See also Jacobs, supra note 3, at 103 ("[I]f the structure, sequence, and organization rules are
extended beyond the facts of Whelan, compatible development could first be chilled by the
very existence of these similarities and then, again, shut down entirely. This would be incon-
sistent with copyright principles.") (The court in Lotus has extended the Whelan holding in
protecting the structure, sequence, and organization of the 1-2-3 interface.).
See also Kapor, supra note 308:
Twisting and straining each step of the way to secure additional copyright pro-
tections, too many companies seem to have decided that it's easier to sue their
rivals than compete with them. Litigation is becoming a business tactic, not a
practice of last resort. Software should not be an industry driven by litigation.
That would be bad for both the industry and its millions of customers.
Id.
327. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
328. Some industry observers feel that Lotus has sued its competitors in order to counter-
act its loss of market share. See, e.g., Quindlen & Alsop, Protectionist Actions by Lotus and




faces can boost the sales of a product. The first vendor to create a new
interface would enjoy an exclusive market position until other vendors devel-
oped their own programs utilizing a similar interface. 329 The first vendor
would also hold the reputation of having been the first on the market. As-
suming the product achieves a certain level of success, other vendors would
market programs incorporating interfaces similar to the original.330 These
secondary vendors would enjoy the chance of luring users away from the
original product. They could achieve this only by competing with the origi-
nal product by adding features, increasing efficiency and/or lowering prices.
Users would benefit from the increased competition, lower prices, greater
variety of viable alternatives, and reduced retraining time. Copyright would
still provide adequate incentive for developers to continue to innovate, while
yielding the greatest public benefits. 331
C. The Unique Nature of Software Demands Separate Legislation.
Copyright law currently covers art, literature, drama, music, and
software. 332 Though well suited to the first four subjects, copyright fails to
accommodate the unique needs of software. 333 Unlike art or literature,
software grows obsolete within a very short time. Only experts can make
sense of the actual code used in creating programs. The software industry
itself has evolved and changed drastically since Congress amended the Act
in 1980.334 The current law does not properly balance the incentives needed
329. Cloning the interface of a successful product does not guarantee success. The clone
applications must be able to stand on their own against the competition. See Kapor, supra
note 308, at 520 ("Cloning applications is an unviable business strategy. Success in the
software business depends on many factors: documentation, training, customer support, and
the quality of customer relations in general.").
330. See Jacobs, supra note 3, at 102-3 (the competitors must still "go through the vast
majority of the development effort.") ("[I]ndependent development is a technically difficult
task, at least as difficult as, and perhaps more difficult than, noncompatible development.")("Permitting the independent development of compatible products thus does not introduce
into the copyright equation a free rider problem of any significance.").
331. Cf Farrell, supra note 96, at 42.
With weak protection [of the user interface], a successful innovator's imitative
rivals are likely to produce "clones" or compatible products .... This competi-
tion within the standard actually reinforces the standard .... strengthening still
further the incentives for still more rivals to join the bandwagon. Thus with an
open standard, firms are likely to compete on price, performance and additional
features, as with the PC standard in personal computers.
Id.
332. See generally 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-02 (1988) (effective Jan. 1, 1978).
333. See N.Y. Times, Jul. 22, 1990, § 3, at 4, col. 1 (quoting M. Kapor, the original
founder of Lotus: "The copyright and patent frameworks were developed over hundreds of
years, and they just don't work well with digital, computerbased media.... Ultimately the
Congress is going to have to do something that addresses intellectual property rights for digital
media."); see also Lavin, supra note 13, at 29.
It's about time that legislators both here and across the Pond woke up to the
fact that PCs (and the machines that will spring from PC lineage in the near
future) will play a big part in shaping society and economies in years to come.
Bending a 10-year-old law to fit the Lotus user interface is the wrong way to go
about managing this dynamic facet of human enterprise.
Id.
334. See Lavin, supra note 13, at 29 ("In the decade since Congress last addressed the issue
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for innovation and the benefits available to the public in the software con-
text. Protecting software conflicts at times with protecting traditional
works.3 35 Separate legislation could achieve a better balance between the
public benefits from compatibility and the private incentives to innovate.
Separate legislation protecting software would have similarities with copy-
right. Such a legislative act would still grant a limited monopoly for a sub-
stantial term336 for the literal computer code.337 The act should treat the
user interface in one of three ways. Either the interface should receive no
protection, 338 very limited protection,339 or substantial protection with
mandatory licensing. 34 Due to the complex and rapidly changing nature of
the field, Congress should delegate the authority to update and modify the
act as needed to an independent agency or committee of experts.341
V. CONCLUSION
Copyright law should not protect the user interface.342 The dual purposes
of copyright envision adequate incentive to innovate balanced against the
public interest in the dissemination of the works.343 Current copyright law
gives more protection than needed to encourage innovation, thus depriving
the public of significant benefits. Standardization and compatibility would
serve the public welfare by reducing retraining time and increasing competi-
tion. The balance between private incentive and public benefit has gone
awry. Congress should enact separate legislation specifically addressing the
unique characteristics of the user interface and of the software industry to
regain the balance. 344
of copyright, little attention has been paid to writing laws that foster more creativity and
innovation (and protect that innovation) in the unique environment that is the modern PC
industry.").
335. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1990, § 1, at 1, col. 1 (amendment to the Act concerning fair
use of unpublished works failed solely out of concern for its effect on software).
336. 75 years, for instance.
337. Both source and object code should continue to enjoy protection.
338. Thus allowing anyone to immediately use the structure, sequence, and organization of
the menu structure, screen displays, function key assignments, and macro functions in produc-
ing his own program. This would allow sharper competition, but could potentially provide less
than the ideal amount of incentive to further innovate.
339. Two or three years of exclusive use, for example.
340. Fifty years of protection, but with a mandatory licensing provision after the first year
at a rate fixed by Congress, CONTU (National Commission on New Technological Uses of
Copyrighted Works), or a royalty committee.
341. CONTU might serve well for such a purpose.
342. See supra notes 308-31 and accompanying text.
343. See supra notes 26-33 and accompanying text.
344. See supra notes 332-41 and accompanying text.
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